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Foreword 
Incremental improvements of existing systems will not be enough to achieve the scale 
in the reduction of energy and material consurrlption and ,their associated 
environmental in-lpacts that would be required to counterbalance the twill pressures 
of population growth and economic development. Radical innovations will be needed 
including new transport, industrial and urban systems. 
From this perspective, global environmental sustainability requires a shift to a new 
"techno-economic paradigm". Such a new paradigm cannot at present be described 
comprehensively even in qualitative terms (and it can be reduced even less to simple 
tabulations of environmentally critical technologies). The reason for that is that many 
essential features of the interactions between technology and environment at present 
are ~~lncertainties. We are unsure about the temporal and spatial scales of 
environmental change, about the exact causation mechanisms of these changes, how 
past and current patterns of developmelit and use of technologies in,l'luence 
envirorlniental change, and especially how all these factors interact in the future. 
Uncertainties and surprises are thus not only genuine elements in technological 
evolution (and the formation of past techno-economic paradigms), but even more so 
in the way technology and environment interact. 
There are at least two types of uncertainties in the interactions between technology 
and the environment. 'The first one is uncertainty about technical change. It deals 
with the unknowns of performance and functions an emerging technology may 
ultimately assume, what kind of modes of social usage it will entail, and what the 
cumulative long-term effects of these modes of usage might be. The second 
uncertainty deals with environment proper: not only current environmental problems 
are frequently ill-understood, there is more uncertainty yet concerning possible future 
environmental problems. To illustrate this, just imagine how difficult it would have 
been to anticipate changes in stratospheric chemistry (ozone depletion) at the time 
CFCs were introduced as benign replacements of propellants and refrigerants in the 
1 920s. 
Facing uncertainty, which is the main characteristic of the interactions between 
technology and environment, it is thus necessary to improve the capacities of 
broadening our portfolio of technological alternatives; to learn continuously about the 
evolving characteristics of the interactions between development and environment; and 
to strengthen what Herbert Simon termed "metatechnologies" (technologies of decision 
procedures). A new techno-economic paradigm must, therefore, above all, entail new 
modes of production and distribution of environmentally valuable knowledge, allowing 
the system to acquire and monitor information continuously and to reassess both 
environmental and technology policy objectives. Here, new methods of learning and 
observation technologies, capable of producing data on a global scale (such as the 
Global Ocean Observation System), as well as the old (but changing) methods of 
"research by accident" matter. In our view, the most important problem deals, 
perhaps, no longer with the lack of available knowledge. It deals rather with 
information handling, ,filtering, and distribution. This perception is based on ,the 
iii 
Simonian recognition that the scarce resource is no longer knowledge but attention. 
The issues of production and distribution of environmentally valuable knowledge are 
being addressed in a series of informal discussion meetings of the Technology and 
Envirotiment (T&E) network established at IlASA within the framework of the 
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) Project. The T&E network is 
organized to produce a series of discussion papers on various aspects of the problem 
at hand (research by accident, attention management, new economics of technological 
learning, large scale observation systems, origins of technological "lock-in"), and is 
aimed at establishing an interdisciplinary base to discuss the interactions between 
technology (or rather of technological change) and the environment. 
This paper by Thomas Schelling is ,the first of this series. It deals with a key aspect 
of (uncertainty in) knowledge generation: unanticipated discoveries. The first part of 
the paper provides an illustration of what Schelling terms "research by accident", 
defined as a central cognitive device to generate unanticipated knowledge: in R&D for 
a new technological alternative as substitute to an old technology, scientists and 
engineers are inclined to narrow their vision, being preoccupied with simply 
accomplishing, with the new technology, what the old technology did. As very well 
documented in the case of nuclear weapons, such a cognitive bias leads to a 
sequence of unanticipated discoveries - a process of research by accident which will 
subsequently reveal properties and characteristics of the technology which were not 
expected initially. One lesson of Schelling's paper is the importance of basic research 
as a source of information that one did not know was needed when it was first decided 
to deploy a new technology. The challenge is to improve ways of accessing existing 
knowledge at any one time so as to reduce the probability of surprise. 
The second part of the paper deals with situations where the scarce resource is no 
longer information but attention. As illustrated with the example of energy studies of 
the 1970s, the problem at hand deals with the efficiency of information distribution 
rather than generation. As pointed out by Schelling, it is necessary to make a 
difference between scientific information that exists somewhere and scientific 
information that is known in the right context and to the right people (the persons with 
the capacity to take action or to resist action) at the right time. 
RESEARCH BY ACCIDENT 
Thomas C. Schelling 
We have been warned, if we have a technology in place that causes problems 
and needs to be replaced with a new alternative, not to be wholly preoccupied with 
simply accomplishing, with the new technology, what the old technology did. 
The new technology, less familiar than the old, may be different in its 
coniparative applications. If you are too much focused on what the problem is you are 
trying to solve - doing what the old technology accomplished better and without some 
of its disadvantages - you can miss opportunities inherent in the new technology. You 
may also fail to recognize some dangers in the new technology - dangers different 
from the ones that may have made the old technology obsolete. 
I shall illustrate the danger with a historical example, an R&D project that 
appears to have been utterly obsessed with accomplishing on a heroic scale what had 
earlier been accomplished on a comparatively diminutive scale: the development of 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were conceived, designed, developed, and 
engineered by physicists, chemists, mathematicians, and engineers, with the intent of 
building bombs larger by orders of magnitude that any bombs that had ever been ever 
built. And "bombs" is what they had in mind, what they envisioned. What borr~bs 
traditionally did was to explode and to ignite - to produce overpressure and shock, to 
crush structures, to tear things and people apart, to start fires. 
The people who designed the aton-~ic weapon were careful in calculating the 
likely energy yields, and in translating the energy yields into ground-level overpressure 
and thermal radiation according to the altitude of burst. They were not anticipating any 
weapon effects of military significance except blast and thermal radiation; blast and 
thermal radiation were what bombs produced. As a result, in my interpretation, there 
were a number of additional significant weapon effects that were not anticipated, not 
looked for, not tested for, and discovered only by accident. Literally "accident," in 
most cases, i.e., an unexpected misadventure1. 
Indeed, one c o ~ ~ l d  propound a "law" of weapon development: if you have a 
' See Cowan and Foray, 1995 for a taxonomy of research procedures including research by accident. D. 
Foray and A. Griibler. 
serious safety problem on the test range that is hard to eliminate, you have just 
discovered a new weapon effect! 
The first such effect occurred at Hiroshima. It was "prompt" radiation, neutron 
radiation that caused immediate or nearly immediate radiation sickness (and was later 
to prove mutagenic). This effect was not observed by the Americans, who had 
nobody on the ground; it was a discovery of the Japanese. At the altitude of the 
bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, neutron radiation would not play a major role: 
anyone within lethal radius of the neutrons would likely be destroyed in the blast 
damage or by thermal radiation; but a person distant from collapsible structures, 
protected by white clothing from thermal radiation, could be vulnerable to radiation 
sickness and death. 
This form of radiation was later elevated into a major weapon effect in the 
concept of the "neutron bomb," or "enhanced radiation weapon," that, though never 
deployed, received widespread attention and provoked widespread controversy in 
1959-60 and again during the Carter Administration. But it was probably unanticipated 
because there were no physiologists, or other medical scientists, involved in the 
atomic bomb development. 
The next weapon effect, unanticipated and discovered by "accident," was 
nuclear fallout. The test of a hydrogen weapon caused a mysterious precipitation to 
fall on a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon. If the Hiroshima neutrons were 
"prompt radiation," this was "delayed radiation." Once discovered, as a result of this 
nuclear-test accident, fallout became recognized as a major weapon effect; some 
military planners considered it, as a weapon of mass retaliation, more potent than blast 
and radiation, and not dependent on any significant accuracy . (People my age 
remember vividly the fallout-shelter campaign of 1960-61 .) Fallout was what the 
"infernal device" of the movie, Dr. Stranqelove, was going to destroy the world with. 
When American weapon designers wanted to measure the effects of high- 
altitude bursts they chose Johnston Island, well over the horizon to the southwest of 
Hawaii. After a test a strange thing occurred: Johnston Island lost radio contact with 
the mainland for many hours. The earth's magnetic field was disturbed. If this could 
happen to Johnston Island with a single high-altitude burst in peacetime, imagine what 
could be done to enemy (or one's own) military communications in war! What began 
as an unexpected test-range nuisance was recognized as a major nuclear-weapon 
effect. Furthermore it was one that required understanding and planning: the burst 
elevations that one might use against military targets were not those likely to produce 
the radio effect. 
A similar thing happened with another high-altitude shot. This time it was radar 
blackout, shorter-lived than radio blackout, but similarly unexpected, similarly 
potentially potent militarily. At first it was a test-range annoyance; when recognized 
it became a significant weapon effect. It would have been crucial in attacks 
confronting anti-ballistic-missile systems. 
"Retinal burn" was discovered similarly. Animals were being used to test likely 
effects on human bodies, especially effects on behavior that might be due to radiation. 
Some strange behaviors turned out to be due to the fact that many of the rabbits and 
other creatures had gone blind, some temporarily, some permanently. The flash had 
burned the retinas of their eyes. But if it could burn rabbit retinas it could burn 
soldiers' retinas i f a nuclear burst - too distant to do them other harm - caught them 
by surprise looking in the direction of the burst. (An R and D effort was begun to 
develop safety glasses that would convert from clear to dark quickly enough to protect 
retinas.) 
Still another effect of momentous importance was discovered "by accident" 
during high-altitude tests at Johnston Island. Electrical equipment that was crucial to 
monitoring the effects of the blast went out of commission just as the blast went off. 
This time it clearly couldn't be coincidence. What had just been discovered was 
"electromagnetic pulse," a sudden pulse of induced electricity that burned out key 
components. It appeared potentially capable, once understood and designed for (or 
against), of destroying entire communication systems, a major weapon effect. (Those 
who saw the TV movie, The Dav After, some years ago will remember not only the 
nuclear fallout but the stalled autos in downtown Kansas City.) 
A final effect may be worth mentioning because it miqht have been discovered 
by accident in an offshore nuclear test. This is the possibility that if a weapon of 
appropriate yield were detonated at the right ocean depth and the right distance from 
shore, with due regard to the configuration of the ocean floor, a massive tidal wave - 
"tsunami" - might be produced that could inundate coastal cities. This effect was 
thought of, and indeed taken into account, in the planning of underwater tests. I 
mention it to highlight the role that even amateur imagination can play in the 
intellectual exploration for technological effects. -This effect - a tidal wave generated 
by a nuclear weapon - was visualized by a diplomat-scholar-novelist more than half 
a decade before Leo Szilard delivered Einstein's famous letter to President Roosevelt. 
In Public Faces, published 1933, Harold Nicolson incorporated two technological 
advances that were to reach fruition only toward the end of World War II, jet (or 
rocket) engines and atomic bombs. The climax of this extraordinary novel was a 
British jet-delivered atomic bomb dropped into the Atlantic some three hundred miles 
off the coast of Charleston (as a weapon test!) wl-~ich generated a tsunami that hit 
Cliarleston and two neighboring cities, killing ninety thousand people. 
I have told this story of unanticipated technological discovery in detail partly 
because it is almost monotonously faithful to what we were warned against in my first 
paragraph above - being wholly preoccupied with simply accomplishing, with the 
sought new technology, what the old technology did - and partly because it involves 
one of the two most expensive and extensive research and development projects ever 
undertaken (space technology being the other). But I haven't answered the question 
why so much of the extraordinary potential of nuclear weapons had to be stumbled on. 
The question deserves an answer that I can't claim to give. But it looks as if several 
considerations apply. 
One is that people were designing bombs to do more and more, and better and 
better, what bombs had always done; what nuclear bombs might do that was 
interesting and useful, or interesting and dangerous, was slow to be appreciated. 
(When proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative - "Star Wars" - took front stage, 
"exotic" weapon effects took front stage too.) 
Second may be that secrecy and curiosity are somewhat incompatible. Only 
professionals - security-cleared professionals - had access to the technology and to 
the testing. Later, school children would design experiments to be performed aboard 
the shuttle in outer space; no such access was available during nuclear testing. The 
Harold Nicolsons who might have known just enough not to know any better than to 
"invent" radio blackout for fictional excitement couldn't get close enough. (And if they 
did, they might have been denied the security clearance needed for access to their 
own writings!) 
There is a temptation to attribute this blind stumbling onto newer and newer 
nuclear potentialities to military predilections, military institutions, a military mindset. 
But the history of post-war civilian nuclear developments does not clearly appear to 
be qualitatively superior. The first breathless writing about nuclear energy went 
overboard with electricity "too cheap to meter." That I think we can excuse as simply 
bad economics and bad technological thinking: somebody forgot that all you get with 
nuclear energy is hot water. You still have to generate electricity and transmit it. 
(Free gasoline doesn't mean free automobiles, free roads, free parking ....) 
What the early explorers of nuclear energy noticed was that nuclear generation 
didn't require any "fuel," anything that had to be "burned." (Nuclear fuel "burns" only 
metaphorically.) But it was the Navy that recognized the more interesting fact that 
nuclear energy doesn't require any oxygen! (For anthropological reasons we think of 
"fuel" as what oxidizes, not as either one of two substances that interact to release 
energy.) Anaerobic generation of energy was something only submariners - and later, 
space explorers - could appreciate: air was scarcer than diesel fuel under water. 
Least appreciated by early enthusiasts for nuclear energy was what is likely, in 
decades to come, to be valued more than nuclear energy for electric power - 
radioisotopes. They have revolutionized medical diagnosis and treatment; they have 
revolutionized physiological research, especially neurological research in the brain; 
their applications in research seem unlimited. Ironically the evolution of nuclear 
capability went from the gigantic - the megaton fireball and the 1000 megawatt power 
plant - to the molecular. 
I have picked on the developers of nuclear energy; let me pick, for a while, on 
myself and some of my colleagues. During the 1970's and early 1980's I participated 
in something like five different energy studies. Each of these studies involved 20 or 
30 people who shared responsibility for the policy conclusions. Each involved 
economists, technologists, and political scientists; some involved businessmen from 
energy-producing or energy-using industries. I recently had occasion to go back and 
look at all these energy studies to see what we had to say about the environment. 
The first, sponsored by the Ford Foundation and administered by The Mitre 
Corporation, was a two-year study that resulted in a book of four hundred pages 
(Keeny, 1977); its subject was nuclear energy. The book contained extensive 
discussions of reactor safety, nuclear wastes, and weapon proliferation, had eight 
pages on the health effects of burning coal, and two pages on greenhouse gases. 
A second study, administered by Resources for the Future and also financed 
by the Ford Foundation, produced a book (Landsberg, 1979) that had six references 
in the index to carbon dioxide and the greenhouse effect adding up to about ten pages 
- ten pages out of six hundred! We were utterly focused on the "energy crisis" - the 
oil shortage and the associated inflation. "Greenhouse" hadn't worked its way into the 
attention of the environmentally concerned scientific community. But I can see no 
reason why it shouldn't have: enough was known to permit speculation, even analysis 
of potential consequences. (There was not yet a Harold Nicolson to write the 
appropriate futuristic novel, or, if there was, this phenomenon hadn't reached his 
attention.) 
In 1979 the Committee for Economic Development published a 62-page booklet 
that I had written (Schelling, 1979). 1 had one prefatory paragraph that mentioned 
environmental health, productivity and esthetics, not a word on greenhouse gases. 
No one ever pointed out my omission of carbon dioxide. No one noticed. 
Three years later I participated in a study on energy pricing policy, a joint 
project of the Committee for Economic Development and the Conservation Foundation. 
(A co-chairman of the study was William K. Reilly, president of the Conservation 
Foundation, who headed the Envirortmental Protection Agency in the Bush 
Administration.) We reported (CED, 1982) on the effect of energy pricing on energy 
technology, energy conservation, new energy resources, inflation, poverty, 
employment, income distribution, and economic efficiency in general. We included 
one sentence on the environment in our 75-page report, and nothing on carbon 
dioxide. In all these cases the study was oriented toward a "well defined" issue -a 
tightly defined issue, a consensually recognized issue, an unambiguous issue. In 
short, an issue that was badly defined for anticipating what would be perceived to be 
important in the next decade - or even soone?. 
Carbon dioxide I first heard about from an interesting source: a study group at 
the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., the military services' one-year 
course for people at the equivalent rank of colonel. 'The military, of course, had no 
responsibility for greenhouse policy; the military wanted 01-~ly to anticipate what climate 
change might consist of and what difference it might make for military operations. The 
navy wanted to know whether the Arctic ice cap would exist in the summertime, and 
how thick it might be, some decades from now; the army remembered the Battle of 
the Bulge and the decisive influence of fog. For the military there was no "greenhouse 
problem," only a potential "greenhouse environment," and they were free to exercise 
imagination. 
My first serious acquaintance with the "Carbon Dioxide Problem," as it was then 
called, was in 1978. The Chancellor of Germany had put the issue on the agenda of 
a "Summit" to be held in Venice, and the White House asked the National Academy 
of Sciences for advice. (I believe the Chancellor's motivation may have been that his 
nuclear energy programs were being attacked by greens, and he wanted to publicize 
the perils of coal.) I, utterly innocent of the subject, was made chairman of a 
committee of twelve, and had to educate myself in a hurry. It is pertinent to report 
here that among the very few people I found who had a broad background in the 
subject were Jesse Ausubel and Bill Clark, both IlASA alumni, and of course Roger 
Revelle, well known to IIASA. I never, at the time, discovered any other research 
organization that had done integrated work on the subject. Individuals worked on 
aspects of the subject, at numerous locations; only at IlASA did the topic appear to 
have organized itself. The National Academy had indeed set up a committee a few 
years earlier, headed by Jules Charney, to examine the likely "global warming" due 
to an increase in CO,. It reported the now classic 3 +or- 1.5 C, and that was the end 
of it. 
The subject got a boost at the end of the Carter Administration. The synthetic 
fuels bill that was passed in 1980, out of concern for the high carbon concentration in 
coal-based gas and liquid, called for a study, again by the National Academy, of the 
"Carbon Dioxide Problem." A committee, somewhat overlapping my earlier committee, 
this time chaired by William Nierenberg, studied the subject for two years and issued 
a book-length report in 1983, a report somewhat at variance with another report 
released within the same month by the Environmental Protection Agency. Partly, at 
least, because the two reports differed in their assessments of seriousness and 
urgency, there was some media attention. Then mostly silence in the United States. 
Research in aspects of ,the subject accelerated but with little if any coordination. 
See Brooks, 1995 for development of this argument as a "management attention problem." D. Foray and 
A. Grubler. 
It was a few hot summers that propelled the subject into scientific prominence 
in the United States, and the scientific "community" was not in advance of the general 
public and the media. There are now, to take an example, two hundred American 
economists participating in greenhouse research; ,fifteen years ago I think there were 
two. Some people think the subject is urgent, that a decade matters. Why didn't the 
subject get, ten years ago, the attention it gets now? Was something missing, without 
which scientific attention could not be mobilized? Money, of course; foundation 
and government money is available now as it was not ten years ago. But what may 
have been most lacking was imagination. Or perhaps coordination: so many 
disciplines are involved that scientists engaged in what was potentially "greenhouse 
research" may not have known there was a greenhouse phenomenon to which their 
work was pertinent, or, if they did, how to connect with the work of other disciplines 
remote from their own. 
IlASA played a leading role in getting scientific attention, even policy attention, 
drawn to the greenhouse problem. Might it have done more? What is the next 
comparable issue that needs an imaginative systems approach to mobilize the world's 
scientific attention? 
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